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Abstract— In this paper, we analyze a round-based pricing
scheme that encourages favorable behavior from users of real-
time P2P applications like P2PTV. In the design of pricing
schemes, we consider price to be a function of usage and capacity
of download/upload streams, and quality of content served. Users
are consumers and servers at the same time in such networks, and
often exhibit behavior that is unfavorable towards maximization
of social benefits. Traditionally, network designers have overcome
this difficulty by building-in traffic latencies. However, using
simulations, we show that appropriate pricing schemes and usage
terms can enable designers to limit required traffic latencies, and
be able to earn nearly 30% extra revenue from providing P2PTV
services. The service provider adjusts the prices of individual
programs incrementally within rounds, while making relatively
large-scale adjustments at the end of each round. Through
simulations, we show that it is most beneficial for the service
provider to carry out 5 such rounds of price adjustments for
maximizing his average profit and minimizing the associated
standard deviation at the same time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed a significant growth
in the usage and utility of P2P networks. These networks
have grown from earlier basic ones like Napster and Gnutella
to more recent and sophisticated ones like BitTorrent. P2P
networks provide an effective mechanism for resource sharing,
allowing sharing of memory and processing power. This allows
workload distribution and load balancing making computing
systems more efficient. P2P networks also provide advantages
such as scalability and reliability that are important character-
istics of distributed systems. They make information sharing
easy and make information pools easily accessible to a large
group of users.
P2P networks originally emerged to provide extensive file
and information sharing. These systems undoubtedly met
their requirements and introduced a new trend in information
sharing making it easier and widely accessible to a large
group of users. With the emergence of more sophisticated
P2P networks, their capabilities were used to add a new
dimension to resource sharing. Systems on these networks
can now share resources like storage space and processing
power, thus providing a higher performance at lower costs.
A related advantage is workload distribution enabling parallel
processing among systems on the network, thereby leading to
a more efficient, robust and reliable computing system.
The lack of central administration in P2P networks ensures
that there is no need for users to trust a single authority or
depend on one for their operation. An emerging trend is the
harnessing of advantages of P2P networks in the television
domain, commonly called P2PTV. Software applications sup-
porting P2PTV are designed to redistribute video streams or
files on a P2P network. They allow users to watch the content
as it is being downloaded, and each user, while downloading
the content also uploads it to other interested peers thereby
contributing to the overall available bandwidth. Such behavior
provides significant savings in bandwidth while also making
downloading and sharing of live content cost-effective and
simpler. By allowing content to be downloaded by peers from
peers, P2PTV networks reduce the load on the central content
generating server. Due to the server workload reduction and
the ability to share TV channels among peers, P2PTV makes
TV channels available to a larger community of users at
reasonable costs.
However, the design of P2PTV systems must take into
account selfish nodes and their refusal to cooperate and share
content. This paper discusses a round-based pricing adjustment
scheme to provide incentives to users as the TV channel
content is downloaded and viewed by increasing number of
users. It explores a mechanism that maximizes the revenue
of the P2PTV service provider while providing incentives to
users and encouraging them to share content and download
from a closely situated peer.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the
work that has been carried out in scientific literature in the
area of P2P networks and pricing in general. We argue that
the problem of pricing in P2PTV networks is different from the
problem of pricing in P2P networks, which has been handled
before in the earlier literature. Section III describes the setup
of the simulation experiments, and details various assumptions
and models we have used for modeling the network, the users,
their content requests and pricing schemes. In section IV, we
report the results obtained through such experimentation, and
conclude the paper with a discussion on results and future
scope of work in section V.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
The literature pertaining to P2PTV can be divided into three
sub-categories. One part of the literature deals with application
level multicast and effective video streaming to be able to
provide P2PTV users with high-quality video service. The
reader is referred to [1], [2], [3], [4] for a detailed description
of the work carried out in this area.
Second part of the literature deals with design of P2P net-
works to support real-time technologies like P2PTV, whereby
unicast networks can be effectively replaced with P2P-based
networks with as little a bandwidth usage overhead as possible.
However, in most studies it is found that many redundancies
need to be built in to the network design for P2P networks
to be able to replicate the QoS requirements of a real-
time application like P2PTV ([5], [6], [7]). Some works also
compare alternative strategies of constructing redundancies for
P2P networks ([8], [9]).
P2P networks heavily rely on their user penetration and
participation in networks for realizing their promised benefits.
This third part of the literature related to user behavior in
P2P networks is itself divided into three sub-parts. One large
sub-part talks of selfish peers who significantly undermine the
advantages of P2P networks, and deals with the problem of
free-riders. Studies show that as much as 70% of users in
a single Gnutella network are free-riders. ([10], [11], [12],
[13]) talk of various incentivization schemes to overcome this
and to encourage users to share resources. Various incentive
schemes have been proposed to encourage user cooperation in
P2P systems [14] - Inherent generosity ([15], [10]), Monetary
Payment Schemes [16] and Reciprocity based schemes ([17],
[18]).
The second sub-part of the user behavior related part of
literature deals with the problem of non-cooperation of peers
in forwarding lookup messages. In [19], a scheme is setup
to allow all lookup-message forwarders to share profits. In
[20], forwarders get monetary incentives and schemes are
established to prevent peers from overcharging.
The third sub-part of literature deals with the problem of
topology in P2P networks. Peers exploit the principle of local-
ity and usually attempt to minimize costs by selecting peers
that are closest to them. However, such behavior adversely
impacts the topology of P2P networks [21]. This sub-part of
the literature also studies various algorithms for selection of
peers to optimize performance of P2P networks.
In addition to the work carried out in the networking-related
literature, we also look at the work carried out in the area
of revenue management and pricing. The reader is referred
to [22], [23] for a comprehensive treatment on pricing and
revenue optimization models. In addition, [24], [25] present a
broad overview of pricing and revenue management issues and
provide a unified modeling framework focused on dynamic
pricing models in revenue management. [26], [27], [28] for-
mulate complex stochastic dynamic programming models for
the pricing problem, where demand is modeled as a stochastic
process with price-dependent intensity. These works provide
structural results and heuristics based on the deterministic
versions of the pricing problem. In particular, [29], [30], [31]
look at the pricing problem in context of P2P networks.
This paper looks at the problem of pricing in P2PTV net-
works, especially with the aim of encouraging socially-correct
behavior amongst users. Note that as the content and network
bandwidth are both priced, the service provider should be able
to incentivize certain uses of the network bandwidth to induce
desired behavior amongst users. The utility of the content
served in P2PTV networks for its users can be expected to be
time-sensitive. As the scheduled timing of the program content
being offered passes by, the utility for the users would fall
down significantly, and it is in this respect that the content
can be characterized more or less as perishable in nature. It
is due to this perishable nature of the content on offer that
we contend that the problem of pricing and inducing socially
correct behavior in P2PTV networks should differ from that
in P2P networks. Towards achieving this aim, in this paper
we rely on a simulation-based modeling and experimentation
to estimate the impact of a pricing and incentivization based
scheme on profits earned by the service provider.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Modeling the Network
For our experimental setup, there are two main characteris-
tics that would play an important role in deciding the benefits
users and the service provider observes from offering P2PTV
on a particular network. One characteristic is the density and
the interconnectivity existing in the network, and the other
is the link costing prevailing in the network. Networks that
are denser in structure than others are likely to provide their
users with choice of connecting to a variety of peers, and can
be expected to serve as a better “breeding ground” for Peer-
to-Peer applications like P2PTV. In our work, we estimate
the density of a network through the ratio of the number
of interconnections to the number of users. Link costing in
viewing a P2PTV program has important connotations in
terms of the demand the network would see for the P2PTV
programs being served on it. Larger link costs would serve
as a deterrent for users in subscribing to various programs,
as many of them would find that the link costs plus content
costs of the programs to be larger than their willingness-
to-pay. In such cases, such users would altogether abstain
from watching any P2PTV program. Link costs can have a
variety of cost components and pricing schemes - some of
them are the setup costs, operational or maintenance costs,
pay-per-usage costs and pay-for-connected-time costs. Some
networks like an Ethernet-based LAN would have high setup
costs but low operational and pay-per-usage costs, while others
like Dialup-based connections would have low setup costs but
high pay-per-usage and pay-per-connected-time costs. In our
simulations, we assume that the link cost between two nodes
of the network is a function of the distance between them.
In real-life the function can be expected to have a step-wise
linear form similar to the one shown in Figure 1. Note that
users have a choice in the type of network they use to connect
to their peers even for a given physical distance between them.
For shorter distances, networks like WiFi and Ethernet-based
LANs may be used, while for larger distances Dialup and DSL
based connections may be used.
Figure 1 can be explained as follows. For networks with
high setup costs and low pay-per-usage costs, the link cost can
be assumed to a constant number that is representative of the
amortized cost of installing and operating that network. Once
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Fig. 1. Characteristic Link Costs versus amount of data transferred for various
types of networks and representative Approximation Line
peers are on such networks, the link cost does not depend upon
the distance between them and is denoted by a constant value
function like that depicted for Ethernet-based LANs. However,
for networks with low setup costs and high pay-per-usage and
pay-for-connected-time costs, the characteristics are different.
For example, for Dialup based networks, the user pays for the
length of time he is connected to the network. In such cases, as
the distance between peers increases, the speed of connectivity
between them reduces and the transfer of same amount of
traffic takes longer thereby making link costs vary with time.
This is shown in Figure 1 for the link cost function of
Dialup connections. However, with many network connectivity
options being available for a given pair of peers separated by
some distance, and with different characteristics of each of
these connectivity options, the combined overlapping behavior
is complicated and makes it difficult for us to comprehend
the implications of our results. Hence, we approximate the
combined overlapping link cost function of various networks
by a straight line as shown in Figure 1.
B. Modeling the Users
While simulating users, we assume that their willingness-
to-pay is derived from a common, yet hidden mathematical
model. In usual circumstances where users are not incentivized
to reveal their willingness-to-pay (or utility from watching
a P2PTV program), the service provider tries to estimate
this hidden model of true demand, and prices the service
accordingly. Such estimation is typically carried out over a
period of time, where the service provider learns the right
pricing through trial and error in the marketplace. Note that
such experimentation with pricing in the marketplace through
trial and error is costly, as it loses the service provider
important revenue opportunities.
In a particular simulation run of the model, we can assume
that the willingness-to-pay for each of the users is either
systematically drawn from the underlying hidden model of
true demand, or is a random draw from it. A set of systemat-
ically drawn willingness-to-pay numbers would look like the
staircase approximation shown in Figure 2. Note that such
systematic draws are based on step functions indicating the
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Fig. 2. Estimation of true demand function through stair-case approximation
and random draws for a single-dimensional demand
prices at which the demand increases by one unit as per the
true demand function. On the other hand, the set of random
draws would have many spikes in them, and would look
similar to the underlying true demand model only when the
number of users, and hence the number of draws is large in
the statistical sense. The shape of the observed willingness-to-
pay demand function with random draws with 10, 30, 50 and
100 draws is shown in Figure 2.
Note that while the stair-case approximation correctly de-
picts the true underlying demand function, and would allow us
to compute the true revenue generated, it increases the compu-
tational complexity in calculating the various user scenarios,
as depicted in Figure 3. Figure 2 denotes the error generated in
estimating a one-dimensional demand function with stair-case
approximation and random estimation. Note that the number
of dimensions indicates the number of alternative programs
that are available for the users to view at a particular instant
of time. Figure 3 denotes the number of cases that need to
be evaluated in generating the stair-case approximation of a
two-dimensional demand function.
C. Modeling Content Requests
In this section, we develop the model for characterizing
and simulating the content requests. Let us assume that there
are n programs being telecast simultaneously, and that each
of the users makes the choice of watching one and at most
one of these programs at a given time. A user’s choice of
program depends upon his utility from watching the program
(thereby leading to his willingness-to-pay), and the network
and the content prices he has to pay for watching the program.
Note that in our models, the service provider does not do any
differential pricing of the content to individual users. How-
ever, the network cost being paid by a user would typically
depend on his P2P network behavior, with users depicting
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Fig. 3. Computational Complexity associated with discrete approximation
cooperative behavior being incentivized appropriately. The
amount of incentives given to individual users would depend
on the incentivization mechanism being adopted by the service
provider.
Let us assume further that the maximum demand to be
expected of each of these n programs can be denoted by
D1, D2 . . . Dn respectively. The service provider in prac-
tice can obtain these values by conducting market surveys.
Let d1, d2, . . . dn denote the actual demand for each of the
programs when the content prices for each of them are
p1, p2, . . . pn respectively. Note that the amount of viewership
for a program not only depends upon its own price, but also
on the price of all other programs. This indicates that we
can expect to have a certain degree of correlation and cross-
dependencies between the demands for various programs. We
use Equation (1) to model the overall demand function of
the various programs offered by the service provider, where
D denotes the demand vector for all programs, P denotes
the current pricing vector set by the service provider and H
denotes the matrix of self and cross-elasticities associated with
the demand functions.
D = H×P (1)
The service provider strives to learn the unknown H by
changing the pricing vector P and observing the resultant
demand vector D. For a given set of M users in the system at
a given point in time, following the random draws method of
the previous section, the individual demands for each of the
programs can be simulated as
d1 ∼ U [0,min(M,D1)] (2)
d2 ∼ U [0,max (0,min (M − d1, D2))] (3)
.
.
. (4)
dn ∼ U
[
0,max
(
0,min
(
M −
n−1∑
i=1
di, Dn
))]
(5)
where U [a, b] denotes a random draw from a uniform distribu-
tion on the range [a, b]. As far as the simulation is concerned,
H can be assumed to be known and the prices corresponding
to a sample set of individual demands can be obtained by
inverting Equation (1).
D. Pricing Schemes and Learning Prices
As a base case for our experiments, we consider that the
users are offered incentives based on the number of programs
they serve to their peers. Such a scheme prompts serving users
to serve whole programs, rather than break in the middle. We
compare the revenue of the service provider who provides such
an incentive scheme with that of a service provider relying
explicitly on unicast transmissions from its servers. Also, we
choose an incentive scheme based on the number of programs
served, rather than a revenue-sharing based incentive model.
Under a revenue-sharing model, there would be a tendency on
the part of serving users to prefer serving high-value content
to low-value content. Such a tendency would make serving the
low-value content a high-cost venture for the service provider.
Incentive programs can also be characterized in terms of the
times at which they require users to declare their intent. For
our base case, we consider real-time sharing incentivization,
where users declare their content requests in real-time, and
the interested user servers declare their intent-to-share also in
real-time. In contrast, in a know-ahead incentivization scheme,
the users are the user servers declare their content requests
and intents-to-share in advance. Such advance declaration
of content requests and intents allows the service provider
to exploit further revenue generating opportunities in the
network. Any such revenue gains can be shared with users to
create a win-win situation for both the users and the service
provider.
Price discovery under uncertain demand is a difficult prob-
lem to solve [22], [23]. In this paper, we use a simple direc-
tional descent based learning mechanism for price discovery.
The process generating the price discovery can be described
as: Users arrive randomly at the service providers “site”, and
check the current prices of all programs slotted for a particular
time-slot. They choose the program that gives them the largest
difference between their willingness-to-pay and the price being
requested. As soon as a user selects a particular program, the
service provider compares its current demand with its target
popularity and adjusts the prices accordingly. Also, as the
users expect prices to change, they come back to the site
at a later point in time to re-evaluate their decisions. Each
time a user comes back to re-evaluate his decision before
the start time of the programs is termed as a round. For
the learning mechanism, the service provider makes small-
step price corrections within rounds, and large-step corrections
between rounds.
IV. RESULTS
For the setup of the simulation experiments described, we
carried out our experiments with 60 users and 15 programs.
We first assumed that the users would re-visit the service
provider’s site for pricing 2-3 times, and hence varied the
number of rounds for our experiments between 2 and 3. The
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Fig. 4. Percentage improvements in benefits in a P2PTV network over a
unicast network
willingness-to-pay function of various users was simulated. We
then calculated the revenues collected by the service provider
for the cases where he runs his network as a P2PTV network,
and find the percentage gains with respect to the revenues
he would have generated by running it as a unicast network.
Figure 4 plots the histogram denoting the percentage benefits
accrued by the service provider by running his network as a
P2PTV network, as against a unicast network, and following
the base case incentive policy described in the previous
section.
In a real-world setup, a service provider would try to
influence user behavior in terms of the number of times
they re-visit the site. We also looked at the potential revenue
benefits the service provider can expect by influencing such
behavior. Table I tabulates the average profit and the associated
standard deviation observed by the service provider in P2PTV
over and above the unicast network case when the number of
rounds are varied. Figure 5 depicts these results in the form
of a graph. We notice that for a value of number of rounds
= 5, the service provider observes the largest average revenue
gain, with the smallest deviation around it.
TABLE I
SERVICE PROVIDER’S AVERAGE PROFIT PERCENTAGE OVER AND ABOVE
UNICAST NETWORK PROFITS AND ASSOCIATED STANDARD DEVIATIONS
WITH VARIATIONS IN NUMBER OF ROUNDS
Rounds Average Profit Profit Std. Dev.
1 18.9 16.6
2 26.4 15.2
3 24.5 14.5
4 25.0 14.1
5 29.7 13.2
6 28.9 13.6
7 24.6 15.1
8 25.4 15.5
10 27.6 15.8
15 26.1 15.4
20 26.8 15.4
30 24.7 14.1
50 20.5 12.8
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Fig. 5. Service provider’s average profit and associated standard deviation
versus the number of rounds
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Discussion on Results
Pricing schemes and incentivization policies are an impor-
tant instrument in the hands of a P2PTV network designer.
In this work, through use of simulations, we have proved that
by use of suitable pricing schemes, the network designer can
provoke users to display socially favorable behavior, and earn
as much as 30% more revenue on average than the case where
he tries and builds a unicast network.
In this paper, we have proposed a mechanism based on
rounds of price adjustments, where the service provider adjusts
prices of individual programs incrementally within rounds,
while making large-scale adjustments only at the end of each
of the rounds. We have experimentally found, as shown in
Figure 5, that it may be optimal for the service provider to have
5 such rounds of price adjustments to maximize his average
profit and minimize the associated standard deviation at that
same time.
Significant synergies exist between the business of a net-
work service provider, and that of a P2PTV content-provider.
Results of this paper suggest that companies in these individual
businesses would do well by investing in the other business.
In particular, since the network service provider business is
more capital-intensive and larger entry barriers exist in trying
to get into this business, we envisage that players from this
business would start investing more and more into the P2PTV
business.
B. Scope for Future Work
Networks have traditionally been modeled using static mod-
els that typically use the graph-theoretic approach of depicting
users as Nodes of a Graph, and their interconnections using the
Arcs of the Graph. In a P2P network, users often go out of the
Network and come back up. The design of the network keeps
changing in real-time, and an almost real-time optimization is
required to continually get the maximum benefit out of P2P
networks. Due to the dynamic nature of P2P networks, we
argue that dynamic models are required to effectively model
P2P networks and more work needs to be done in this area.
However, as this is not the focus of the current work, we use a
simplistic quasi-static model for modeling P2P networks and
use it to derive our results.
In this work, we have used fairly simplistic models to
characterize the network and the users. More detailed and
accurate models can be used in further studies.
The problem of profit maximization in view of user partici-
pation can be proved to be a non-linear optimization problem
that can potentially have multiple local solutions. In this
work, we have satisfied ourselves with local maximization
results. These solutions do indicate the amount of benefit to be
achieved by such an optimization routine. However, a global
maximum would present the service provider with further
opportunities to increase her profitability.
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